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THE BLINDSIDED INSIDER: INSIDER TRADING 
LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISING A ROGUE TRADER 
ADAM FELSENTHAL* 
 
ABSTRACT 
In the past few years, federal prosecutors and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) have engaged in the widest-ranging and most successful probe 
of insider trading ever, focusing in particular on investment professionals.  However, 
the government has failed to charge anyone on the basis of supervisory liability, 
essentially an accusation of failing to notice and stop illicit trading done under one’s 
supervision.  This Article discusses all of the potential ways in which prosecutors 
could bring such a charge, ranging from SEC administrative liability to civil and 
criminal charges.  Through the lens of a theoretical situation in which an “innocent 
bystander” manager has failed to stop a “rogue trader” from trading on the basis of 
material non-public information, it proposes answers for some of the unanswered 
questions in this area of the law, and assesses the practical potential for the 
government bringing any of the above charges against such a manager. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the greatest nightmares of any investment professional is of being 
accused of insider trading.  Recently, this has become closer to reality.  The 
Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) (collectively, the “government”) have been 
engaged in a broad investigation of insider trading over the past few years.  Insider 
trading involves the trading of a public company’s stock on the basis of material 
non-public information.  Public corporations must disclose material information to 
all investors or potential investors at the same time.  This five-year investigation, 
dubbed “Perfect Hedge,” is primarily run by prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney’s 
office in the Southern District of New York, the FBI’s New York office, and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.  
One theory of liability that has not yet been utilized in the insider trading probe is 
“control person” liability or liability arising from a manager’s supervision of an 
employee or firm that has violated the securities laws, even if the manager him or 
herself has not committed a crime.  However, the government has indicated that it 
will step up this area of enforcement. Merri Jo Gillette, Director of the Chicago 
Regional Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission, recently stated that the 
SEC “is now bringing more secondary liability cases.”1  This Article analyzes the 
                                                           
 1 Noam Noked, An “Entrepreneurial” and Restructured SEC Pledges Proactive 
Enforcement, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION, 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/04/05/an-entrepreneurial-and-restructured-sec-
pledges-proactive-enforcement/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
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potential civil and criminal “control person” or supervisory liability of a manager 
arising from violations of the securities laws committed by his or her subordinate 
employees.  In particular, this Article focuses on a theoretical situation.  In this 
situation, a “rogue trader” has knowingly traded on the basis of material non-public 
information.  The trader’s “innocent bystander” manager has had contact with the 
trader but is unaware of the trader’s illicit activities.  The Article primarily focuses 
on the prevailing law in the Second Circuit, in addition to SEC administrative law.2  
It begins by discussing briefly two global issues, applicable to any assertion of 
control person liability, regarding the definition of a “control person” and the power 
of such a person to delegate responsibility.  Then, the potential claims are discussed.  
Although control person charges arising out of insider trading are extremely rare, 
this Article discusses the potential bases for liability of SEC civil liability under 
section 20(a) and 21A  (the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act) 
of the Exchange Act, sections 203 and 204A of the Investment Advisers Act, 
primary insider trading liability under (1) the “conscious avoidance,” doctrine, (2) as 
an aider and abettor, or (3) under common law respondeat superior principles, and 
finally potential control-person related criminal liability. 
This Article concludes that the threat of traditional control person liability under 
21A (the most likely claim) or other bases for liability will depend on how much the 
manager participated in the fraud or have access to sufficient red flags to alert him or 
her to any potential wrongdoing on the part of the rogue trader, and on the 
compliance systems in place to protect against such wrongdoing.  The SEC would 
have a better case for administrative liability as there is a lower bar for the level of 
misconduct required on the part of the control person, but such a case could not be 
brought in federal court and in any case would turn on the level of the compliance 
program of the firm in question.  In addition, such a manager faces little threat from 
primary liability as the respective bars for a mental state (under the “conscious 
avoidance” doctrine) or required action on the part of the control person (under 
aiding and abetting liability) are too high to warrant concern.  Finally, federal 
prosecutors would have essentially no basis for criminal liability against the 
manager. 
ANALYSIS 
I.  GLOBAL ISSUES IN CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY 
A.  Definition of “Control Person” 
To assert control person liability against a manager, prosecutors would first have 
to allege that the manager “controlled” the firm and/or an individual at the firm who 
violated the securities laws.  In sum, it appears fairly clear that most manager would 
                                                           
 2 Many hedge funds are located in the District of Connecticut or the Southern District of 
New York.  In addition, essentially all of the most prominent insider trading charges against 
hedge funds have been brought in the Southern District of New York.  As a result, this Article 
assumes that any claims/charges would be brought in the Second Circuit.  However, it should 
be noted that a provision in “Dodd-Frank” grants the SEC power to serve subpoenas anywhere 
in the U.S. for claims brought under several statutes including the Exchange Act.  Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 929E (2010).  One source has suggested that this provision may encourage the 
SEC to file suits in circuits with friendlier pleading standards, provided that it can show 
proper venue.  See Zachary S. Brez, R. Daniel O’Connor & Joseph G. Cleeman, Control 
Person Liability, 5 BLOOMBERG L. REPS. 17 (2011). 
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be considered a control person, due to the broad nature of the tests used by both the 
regulatory guidance and relevant case law.   
1.  Statutory Definition and Regulatory Guidance 
A control person for purposes of the securities laws statutorily includes: “Every 
person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable.”3  Because the statute 
itself does not define what it means to “control any person,” the SEC provided 
clarification in Rule 405: “control means the possession, direct or indirect, of the 
power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, 
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.”4  
While there is no formal definition of control beyond the above, the definition 
provided in the Uniform Application for Broker-Dealer Registration with the SEC 
may shed some light on “control”:  
The power, directly or indirectly, to direct the management or policies of 
a company, whether through ownership of securities, by contract, or 
otherwise. Any person that:  
(i) is a director, general partner or officer exercising executive 
responsibility (or having similar status or functions);  
(ii) directly or indirectly has the right to vote 25% or more of a 
class of a voting security or has the power to sell or direct the 
sale of 25% or more of a class of voting securities; or  
(iii) (iii) in the case of a partnership, has the right to receive upon 
dissolution, or has contributed, 25% or more of the capital, is 
presumed to control that company.5  
However, this latter definition is binding only for the purpose of Form 
BD. 
2.  Case Law 
Some courts cite directly to the SEC guidance when determining who is a 
controlling person.  "Most, however, find alternative reasoning in their determination 
of control and ignore the SEC’s definition altogether."6  In the Second Circuit, a 
plaintiff must plead facts which “support a reasonable inference that [defendants] 
had the potential power to influence and direct [] activities.”7  This is a broad test; as 
explained by one court, “‘Control’ for purposes of control person liability . . . 
                                                           
 3 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(a) (West 2012). 
 4 17 C.F.R. 230.405(f) (2012). 
 5 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Uniform Application for Broker-Dealer Registration (Form 
BD), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formbd.pdf (last accessed Mar. 20, 2013). 
 6 Laura Greco, The Buck Stops Where?: Defining Controlling Person Liability, 73 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 169, 173 (1999).  While most of the cases discussed below are in the specific 
context of an alleged violation of section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, the various avenues for 
liability as a control person all use this body of law as a model for defining a control person. 
 7 Sloane Overseas Fund Ltd. v. Sapiens Int’l Corp., 941 F. Supp. 1369, 1378 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996); Food & Allied Serv. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Millfeld Trading Co., 841 F. Supp. 
1386, 1392 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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requires only some indirect means of discipline or influence short of actual 
direction.”8  As a result, generally control will be imputed if de facto day-to-day 
control can be demonstrated regardless of the formal title.  In this regard, courts in 
the Second Circuit have held people with a wide variety of positions and 
circumstances liable as control persons of an organizational defendant, including 
inside or outside directors;9 persons with a substantial equity interest;10 persons with 
a right to appoint directors;11 persons with preemptive rights over a firm and an 
ability to control public communication;12 makers or signers of required SEC 
statements;13 executive officers14; persons with a family relationship to a controlling 
persons;15 persons with the ability to approve statements or SEC filings;16 and 
persons who directed corporation with regards to specific primary violations at issue, 
despite not being a director or senior executive.17 
One specific issue for many firms which include an array of interconnected legal 
entities is whether a manager would be considered a control person of any of the 
affiliated entities.  While there are not that many decisions specifically within the 
Second Circuit on this issue, generally courts simply consider whether the person 
had in fact meaningful control over the other entities, regardless of technical 
structuring.  For example, the following principles apply: 
 
                                                           
 8 In re Bausch & Lomb, Inc. Sec. Litig., 941 F. Supp. 1352, 1368 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).   
 9 Salit v. Stanley Works, 802 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1992) (reasoning that directors are 
found necessarily to have some indirect means of influence over their corporation and its 
management, and that the conclusion is inescapable that persons acting as directors are in 
control of the corporation); In re Philip Servs. Corp. Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 463 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (the court found the directors liable in part because they signed a registration 
statement for the securities at issue). 
 10 Ind. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 741 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating 
that defendants had “substantial equity” in corporation and had signed registration statements 
in question); In re Health Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding 
control liability even against wife of founder and holder of 11.4% equity interest; wife was 
also a director). 
 11 Griffin v. PaineWebber, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 2292(VM), 2001 WL 740764 (S.D.N.Y. June 
29, 2001). 
 12 Id. 
 13 E.g., Robbins v. Moore Med. Corp., 788 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 14 Neubauer v. Eva-Health USA, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding control 
liability not only against husband who was Chairman, CEO, and Founder, but even against 
wife who was merely Corporate Secretary). 
 15 In re MTC Elec. Techs. S’holders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (involving 
director of marketing who was also son and nephew of two most powerful corporate officers); 
In re Health Mgmt., 970 F. Supp. 192; Neubauer, 158 F.R.D. 281. 
 16 Food & Allied Serv. Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v. Millfeld Trading Co., 841 F. Supp. 
1386 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 17 In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp., 469 F. Supp. 2d 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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• An officer of one of several related companies with integrated 
operations can be considered a control person over all of the 
companies.18 
• An officer of a parent can be considered a control person over a 
subsidiary.19 
• An officer of a subsidiary can be considered a control person over a 
parent when allegations involved misconduct relating to the sub.20  
However, the sub's officer is not considered a control person over the 
parent generally.21 
• Directors of a corporation can be considered control persons of 
partnerships that were major shareholders of the corporation.22 
3.  Insider Trading Context 
Although charges against individuals for controlling persons liability in 
conjunction with insider trading are extremely rare, the available case law indicates 
that the definition used in this context similarly places greater emphasis on whether a 
person had de facto control than a particular title.  In the case of SEC v. Haddad, for 
example, the SEC alleged that someone was a control person of an employee of a 
securities firm, even though he was not in any way “formally associated” with the 
firm, because he “shared control over [the firm's] personnel and operations with his 
brother Jeffrey Brooks” who was the President and CEO of the firm.23 
In sum, it appears fairly clear that anyone with de facto control over a firm's 
affairs is considered a control person over that firm.  
B.  Delegation 
Another global issue is whether a manager could avoid all control person-based 
liability if he or she is not directly responsible for supervising the trading of 
subordinates, through designating sub-managers between him or her and the trader in 
question.  In general, control person-related liabilities are “not limited to hands-on 
managers; they also apply to top executives.”24  However, although delegation does 
                                                           
 18 Poptech, L.P. v. Stewardship Credit Arbitrage Fund, LLC, 792 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. 
Conn. 2011) (officer had served as chief credit officer, managing director, and later president 
of one of three related corporations, that the three corporations were operated as one entity, 
that officer exercised a degree of control over the content of information that investors were 
getting from at least one of the corporations). 
 19 Wells v. Monarch Capital Corp., No. 91-10575-MA, 1991 WL 354938 (D. Mass. Aug. 
23, 1991) (noting the officer's control over the subsidiary's financial statements). 
 20 In re Reliance Sec. Litig., 91 F. Supp. 2d 706 (D. Del. 2000). 
 21 Copland v. Grumet, 88 F. Supp. 2d 326 (D.N.J. 1999); In re Cooper Sec. Litig., 691 F. 
Supp. 2d 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 22 In re SmarTalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 527 (S.D. Ohio 2000). 
 23 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Haddad, S.E.C. Release No. 13473, 1992 WL 383778, at *5 
(Dec. 17, 1992). 
 24 THOMAS L. HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, 23A BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER 
SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW § 11:4 (2010); see also In re David D. Grayson, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-33298, 1993 WL 518406 (Dec. 8, 1993) (noting that the SEC has 
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not provide an automatic shield from liability, the case law indicates that delegation 
can provide a basis for a defense that the top manager did not know or have reason to 
believe that the delegated-to party was not properly supervising the employee.  In 
one case, the court rejected a defense that the ultimate supervisor properly delegated 
responsibility regarding a manager’s trading.25  The court reasoned that the control 
person “knew or should have known” that the lower supervisors “were not 
adequately carrying out those supervisory responsibilities” because he knew that 
they did not perform particular reviews of the trader’s positions, and that in any case 
much of the trader’s volume was unauthorized without any controls for the middle 
managers to be able to monitor it.26  On the other hand, the court accepted the 
interlocking compliance system set up by the defendant in Piper, which provided for 
checks and balances and each piece of which had precise responsibilities, as a 
satisfactory use of the power to delegate.27  The law thus indicates that deciding 
whether a manager properly delegated will depend on the robustness of the 
compliance department of the firm in question and the strength of the monitoring of 
that department on the firm’s traders.  
II.  SECTION 20(A) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT 
A.  Statutory Background 
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act states that: 
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under 
any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall 
also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such 
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable  
. . . unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly 
or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of 
action.28   
This statute renders a person who controls others jointly and severally liable for 
violations of any provision of the Exchange Act,29 subject to a good faith defense.  
                                                           
repeatedly emphasized that supervisory responsibilities are imposed on even the most senior 
members of management of a broker-dealer). 
 25 In re First Capital Strategists, Investment Advisors Act Release No. IA-1648, 1997 WL 
458704, at *7 (Aug. 13, 1997). 
 26 Id. 
 27 In re Piper Capital Mgmt. Inc., S.E.C. Release No. 175, 2000 WL 1759455, at *60 
(Nov. 30, 2000). 
 28 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(a) (West 2012). 
 29 See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Controlling Person Liability Under 
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Section 15 of the Securities Act, 53 BUS. 
LAW. 1, 4-5 (Nov. 1997) (“[S]ection 20(a) imposes secondary liability for primary violations 
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the sweeping antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act. . . .  In 
addition, persons can be held vicariously liable under section 20(a) for primary violations of 
any other provision of the 1934 Act or rule promulgated thereunder . . . .”). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
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This statute has been described as “remedial” in character, and is therefore to be 
construed broadly.30 
A provision of “Dodd-Frank” explicitly provided standing to the SEC to assert 
20(a) claims, due to a split in the circuits whether it had such standing.31  However, 
under the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA) of 1988, 
discussed in Part III, infra, the SEC cannot assert section 20(a) to seek civil money 
penalties.32  Although the SEC could seek an injunction under section 20(a),33 some 
sources claim that the ITSFEA has effectively replaced 20(a) as an enforcement 
proceeding for insider trading supervisory liability.34  Supporting this view, the SEC 
has not brought any insider trading prosecutions under 20(a) since ITSFEA.  Despite 
the lack of practical likelihood that the SEC would assert a violation of 20(a) arising 
out of insider trading, this Article discusses the requirements of that provision due to 
the influence that its well-developed case law has had on other bases for control 
person liability, as discussed below.  
B.  Requirement of “Culpable Participation” 
In the Second Circuit as well as several other judicial circuits, in addition to 
showing that a primary violation occurred and that the defendant “controlled” the 
primary violator, the prosecution must show that the defendant was, in some 
meaningful sense, a culpable participant in the controlled person’s fraud.”35  Courts 
in the Second Circuit, particularly those in the Southern District of New York, have 
expressed three views on whether this requirement, which has no basis in the 
statutory text, imposes a special requirement for pleading and/or proof of the charge.  
Some courts have held that it requires plaintiffs to plead and prove “culpable 
participation” by the defendant.36  These courts themselves diverge on whether a 
                                                           
 30 See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, pt. II, at 7 (1934). 
 31 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
929P(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (2010). 
 32 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1(b)(2) (West 2012) (“No person shall be subject to a penalty under 
subsection (a) of this section solely by reason of employing another person who is subject to a 
penalty under such subsection, unless such employing person is liable as a controlling person 
under paragraph (1) of this subsection.  Section 78t(a) of this title shall not apply to actions 
under subsection (a) of this section.”). 
 33 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(1) (West 2012). 
 34 Compare THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 
12.24[6] (2013) (“Although the controlling person liability provision of section 20(a) applies 
to private actions for improper trading on non-public information, it does not apply under SEC 
enforcement provisions dealing with insider trading.”), with Harold K. Gordon & Tracy V. 
Schaffer, Recent SEC Actions Show Employer Liability for Insider Trading, CORP. COUNSEL 
(July 30, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleFriendlyCC.jsp?id=900005487324 
(listing section 20(a) as one of the SEC’s enforcement options for control person liability for 
insider trading). 
 35 ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 108 (2d Cir. 2007); see also 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Boguslavsky v. Kaplan, 159 F.3d 715, 720 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 36 E.g., In re Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. Litig., No. 00 CIV 9475 SHS, 2002 WL 244597, 
at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002); Rich v. Maidstone Fin., Inc., No. 98 CIV. 2569(DAB), 2001 
 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss1/7
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plaintiff must satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) for fraud-
related claims,37 or the even-higher requirement of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (PSLRA).38  Others have stated that it is merely an element that must be 
proven but does not impose a heightened pleading requirement as well.39  Finally, the 
“oft-stated view” of one Southern District judge (Judge Kaplan) is that plaintiffs 
need not plead or prove culpable participation, claiming in this regard that this 
“element” is essentially non-binding dicta.40 
Relatedly, courts in the Second Circuit dispute what state of mind plaintiffs must 
demonstrate to succeed in demonstrating “culpable participation,” variously holding 
respectively that the plaintiff must prove (1) negligence,41 (2) “conscious 
misbehavior as a culpable participant in the fraud,”42 (3) that the controlling person 
“knew or should have known that the primary violator . . . was engaging in 
fraudulent conduct,”43 or (4) “either conscious misbehavior or recklessness.”44 
Finally, several courts have previously held that, in order to avoid liability under 
section 20(a), a broker-dealer, and perhaps theoretically an investment adviser as 
well, has an higher affirmative duty to ensure that its employees comply with 
                                                           
WL 286757, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2001); Mishkin v. Ageloff, No. 97 Civ. 2690 LAP, 
1998 WL 651065, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1998). 
 37 See Wallace v. Buttar, 239 F. Supp. 2d 388, 395-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d and 
remanded on other grounds, 378 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2004); Maidstone, 2001 WL 286757, at 
*8-10; In re Sotheby’s Holdings, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 1041(DLC), 2000 WL 1234601, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2000). 
 38 In re CINAR Corp. Sec. Litig., 186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); In re 
Deutsche Telekom,, 2002 WL 244597, at *7; Mishkin, 1998 WL 651065, at *23-25. 
 39 E.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 392-97 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003); Sedona Corp. v. Ladenburg Thalmann & Co., No. 03Civ.3120(LTS)(THK), 2005 WL 
1902780, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005). 
 40 See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 547, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re 
Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 307-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 41 In re Initial Pub. Offering, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 396. 
 42 Mishkin, 1998 WL 651065, at *25. 
 43 In re Deutsche Telekom, 2002 WL 244597, at *9; Cromer Fin., Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F. 
Supp. 2d 452, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Dietrich v. Bauer, 126 F. Supp. 2d 759, 765-66 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
 44 Steed Fin. LDC v. Nomura Sec. Int’l, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 8058(NRB), 2001 WL 
1111508, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001); see also In re Bristol Myers Squibb Co. Sec. 
Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 148, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The culpable participation requirement 
can be satisfied by a showing of recklessness, for example, where there has been an extreme 
departure from the standards of ordinary care, or when defendants are aware of facts or have 
access to information contradicting their public statements.”); Wallace v. Buttar, 239 F. Supp. 
2d 388, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 378 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 
2004) (“Thus, the level of mental culpability required . . . is intention or recklessness, the 
control person must have participated . . . with knowledge that the securities laws were being 
violated, or with reckless indifference as to whether a violation occurred.”). 
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applicable securities regulations.45  However, courts have not cited this rule recently; 
one court has explained that, after the Second Circuit clarified that culpable 
participation is an element of the cause of action, and good faith is a defense, this 
broker-specific rule was also implicitly rejected.46 
C.  Case Law Analysis/Factual Basis for Liability 
Most allegations of 20(a) control person liability, especially in the Second 
Circuit, arise in the securities class action context, in which courts rarely reach final 
judgment or even summary judgment.  However, there are several cases that have 
clarified what type of factual basis is needed for liability, although any individual 
decision may depend on which standard for “culpable participation” the specific 
court has accepted.  On one hand, courts appear to demand a showing of 
involvement in the specific transactions at issue.  For example, in one relatively 
recent case, a Southern District court vacated an arbitration panel’s decision to 
impose control person liability and found that its decision “manifestly disregarded 
the facts and the law.”47  The court reasoned that “no evidence was adduced that the 
Petitioners were involved in the allegedly unsuitable and unauthorized transactions 
in the [Plaintiffs’] accounts, or in the misrepresentations and fraud of [the primary 
violator].”48  The court, applying a standard for culpable participation based on 
conscious or reckless behavior, noted that the plaintiffs had no contact with the 
defendants themselves save for a sole handshake, and indeed the plaintiffs could not 
recall any contact nor had heard the names of the defendants prior to initiating the 
arbitration.  Finally, the court noted that “general deficiencies” in control are 
irrelevant in this inquiry, reasoning that the culpable participation requirement 
requires facts “with regard to the specific trades and representations at issue.”49 
On the other hand, the involvement required of the alleged control person 
involvement can be extremely high-level, and possibly even purely financial in terms 
of receiving profits or providing financial backing.  For example, in one case, the 
court denied the motion for summary judgment of a defendant sole shareholder of a 
securities broker.50  The court, appearing to apply a “willful blindness” standard for 
culpable participation, rejected the defendant’s claim that he was a passive investor 
who was not involved in the day-to-day management of the firm and therefore could 
not be liable as a controlling person, noting that the firm bore his name, that he met 
with the executive in charge of managing the firm, that he received profits, as well as 
contested testimony that the defendant was in fact a director of the firm.51  The court 
also reasoned that “there is no real dispute that [Defendant] not only failed to take 
steps to prevent the primary violation but actually provided the financial means by 
                                                           
 45 See Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980); Metzner v. D.H. 
Blair & Co., 689 F. Supp. 262, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Ruiz v. Charles Schwab & Co., 736 F. 
Supp. 461, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 46 See Dietrich, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 767-68. 
 47 Wallace, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 395-397. 
 48 Id. at 396-96. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See id. 
 51 Dietrich, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 766. 
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which the fraud was accomplished, and therefore rejected summary judgment even 
though “the evidence is circumstantial, and in some ways rather thin.”52  In addition, 
some courts have cited the receipt of financial benefits as a factor in finding that a 
defendant has violated this element, although no court appears to have relied on this 
factor exclusively.53 
D.  Good Faith Defense 
Section 20(a) also provides a defense to liability if a defendant can meet the 
burden of demonstrating that he or she “acted in good faith and did not directly or 
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.”54  In 
the Second Circuit, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating good faith.55  
Courts have explained that, to satisfy this burden, the defendant must show that he or 
she “exercised due care in his supervision of the violator’s activities in that he 
maintained and enforced a reasonable and proper system of supervision and internal 
controls.”56 
Courts reject a good faith defense when it is shown that the controlling party has 
ignored several “red flags” and/or has multiple holes in its compliance programs for 
which the control person was ultimately at least partially responsible.  For example, 
in SEC v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., the Second Circuit affirmed a decision that a 
broker-dealer had failed to demonstrate good faith in defending against claims that it 
provided excessive mark-ups for securities the market for which it controlled.57  The 
firm argued that “the markups . . . were established by the Firm’s trading 
department,” and the compliance department reviewed the trades by looking at the 
published listings of interdealer quotes, but the court noted that the defendant’s 
witness acknowledged the defendant’s procedures “did not require” a different 
markup for securities for which the Firm did not control the market.58  Defendant’s 
argument that compliance personnel searched for improprieties was rejected because 
“[compliance officer] conceded that he did not look at all sales and that he 
determined the Firm’s acquisition cost for a security by looking only at transactions 
                                                           
 52 Id. 
 53 In re Blech Sec. Litig., No. 94 Civ. 7696 RWS, 2002 WL 31356498, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 17 2002) (“[A] controlling person’s receipt of financial benefits can demonstrate culpable 
participation.”); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 133, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting 
that in addition to other factors indicating participation by defendants, “[p]laintiffs allege 
sufficiently that these defendants had the power to control the activities which comprise the 
underlying violation and that they participated in the fraud at least by reaping the benefits of 
insider trading”). 
 54 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(a) (West 2012). 
 55 Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
1011 (1980); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1473 (2d Cir. 
1996); see also In re Blech, 2002 WL 31356498, at *22 (rejecting the argument that the 
Second Circuit subsequently overruled Marbury). 
 56 First Jersey, 101 F.3d at 1473 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57  Id. 
 58 Id. at 1473. 
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that occurred on the very day the Firm sold the security.”59  Finally, the court noted 
that “the record showed that the Firm gave its sales representatives little information 
about proper procedures or about the securities they were hawking,” citing such 
deficiencies as a lack of information on risks inherent in the securities, a failure to 
distribute information manuals, a policy that forbade sales representatives from 
contacting the research department without permission from the branch manager, 
and a lack of training on customer suitability concerns.60 
On the other hand, the court in another SEC case found for defendant Lehman 
Brothers where a fairly robust training program was in place.61  In the case, a 
salesperson traded on the basis of material non-public information, and the firm was 
aware that he had frequent contact with management of a particular company even 
though the broker’s customers held large quantities of the company’s stock.  Lehman 
at the time had a compliance department, staffed by “several competent and 
experienced attorneys,” which provided training on compliance issues relating to the 
securities laws, and published memoranda on new issues in addition to a procedural 
manual.  Counterweighing this was the fact that the firm only instituted a seemingly 
necessary rule prohibiting contact with management of companies whose stock is 
owned by its clients after the incident in question.62  The court, although admitting 
that “the issue is close,” found for Lehman on the basis of the good faith defense.63 
The court reasoned that the firm had no actual or constructive notice that the 
employee would pass along the information, had no reason to distrust the 
salesperson’s judgment, and in addition did not book the trade in question.64  The 
court refused to make the broker liable solely because it failed to institute the rule 
mentioned above, reasoning that the firm had a justifiable “lack of focus” on this 
area especially since this “was the first situation that [the control person] had known 
about where such a relationship was maintained.”65 
As the cases above indicate, good faith is a fact-intensive inquiry, but a defendant 
can successfully apply the defense if he or she can show robust compliance programs 
and a lack of tolerance for deviation.  As explained by one recent source regarding 
precautions to take to avoid liability, this defense demands  
sufficient precautions to prevent securities violations before they 
happen…training, supervision, and guidance appropriate to the nature of 
the business . . . the proper “tone from the top” at all times.  Controlled 
persons must understand that misconduct will not be tolerated . . . update 
policies and procedures . . . establish a monitoring/internal audit program 
designed to access the strength and success of the compliance programs.66 
                                                           
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 1473-74. 
 61 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Lum’s, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
 62 Id. at 1064-65. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 1065. 
 65 Id. at 1065. 
 66 Zachary S. Brez et al., Control Person Liability, 5 BLOOMBERG L. REPS. 17 (2011). 
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E.  Application to “Innocent Bystander” Managers 
As discussed above, a major determinate of any liability under section 20(a) is 
the standard that the court adopts for assessing “culpable participation.”  Assuming, 
as appears to be the general trend in the Second Circuit, that some finding of 
recklessness is required, a “bystander” a government action would have trouble 
implicating a manager who was not subjectively aware of the illicit nature of a rogue 
trader’s actions.  Whileone point that may support liability on this prong is that some 
of the trades in question will likely have taken place in official firm accounts and the 
firm will have both provided financial backing and received financial benefits from 
these trades, as no case has substantially relied on this ground, it is unlikely that 
prosecutors would attempt to assert liability on it exclusively. 
In any case, “bystander” managers would likely have a strong good faith defense.  
As the cases above indicate, good faith is a fact-intensive inquiry, but a defendant 
can successfully apply the defense if he or she can show robust compliance programs 
and a lack of tolerance for deviation.67  A manager could point to a lack of “red 
flags” in the trader’s history, as well as a strong compliance program generally. 
III.  THE INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD ENFORCEMENT ACT (ITSFEA) OF 
1988 
A.  Statutory Background 
In 1988, Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement 
Act (ITSFEA), which added section 21A to the Exchange Act and thereby amended 
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984.  The ITSFEA authorizes the SEC to seek 
treble damages from employers or supervisors who failed to prevent insider trading 
by individuals whom they “directly or indirectly controlled.”68  In order to succeed 
on a claim for control person liability under the ITSFEA, the SEC must show that 
the control person either: 
(A) knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that such controlled person 
was likely to engage in the act or acts constituting the violation and failed 
to take appropriate steps to prevent such acts or acts before they occurred, 
or 
(B) knowingly or recklessly failed to establish, maintain, or enforce any 
policy or procedure required under 78o(f) of this title or section 80b-4a of 
this title and such failure substantially contributed to or permitted the 
occurrence of the act or acts constituting the violation.69 
The statute is modeled on the standard for controlling persons liability created by 
the Exchange Act70 with some differences.  The first prong is essentially derivative 
liability, tempered by a recklessness requirement similar to that used by several 
                                                           
 67 Id. (specifying precautions to take to avoid liability). 
 68 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1(a)(1)(B) (West 2012). 
 69 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1(b)(1)(A)-(B) (West 2012). 
 70 H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 17 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6054 
(describing legislative history of ITSFEA, explaining that “[t]he expansion of the scope of 
civil penalties relies on the concept of “controlling person” currently contained in Section 
20(a) of the Exchange Act”). 
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courts inside the Second Circuit to measure the “culpable participation” requirement 
under section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.71  Supporting this interpretation, the House 
Report indicates that the statute mandates “an objective standard of supervision” 
which requires proof of “a gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
responsible person would exercise in such a situation” and “encompasses a heedless 
indifference as to whether circumstances suggesting employee violations actually 
exist.”72  This prong also tempers the standard of liability with a proviso that that 
liability does not attach if a control person took “appropriate steps” to prevent the 
violation, which appears substantively similar to the “good faith” defense under 
section 20(a).73 
However, there are three major differences between ITSFEA and 20(a).  First, as 
opposed to 20(a), where the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate good faith, 
under ITSFEA, the SEC bears the burden of proving the lack of a good faith attempt 
“to take appropriate steps to prevent such acts”74 or provide an adequate compliance 
program.  In addition, the second prong incentivizes affirmative steps to create and 
follow proper procedures by shielding supervisors instituting such procedures from 
control person liability.75  Finally, as discussed above the SEC can pursue a civil 
money penalty under ITSFEA but not 20(a).76 
B.  Case Law 
The SEC has infrequently attempted to impose liability on controlling persons 
under ITSFEA.77  To date it has only brought three unlitigated settlements.78  One 
                                                           
 71 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
 72 H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 18 (1988) (internal citation omitted). 
 73 See id. at 17 (noting that the concept of “controlling person” in section 21A is based on 
section 20(a)); see also 134 CONG. REC. E3,079 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1988) (Statement of Rep. 
Markey) (stating that principal legislative sponsor explaining that the standard of recklessness 
in ITSFEA falls “well below the standard of ‘actual knowledge’ of circumstances suggesting 
violation by the control person”). 
 74 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1(b)(1)(A) (West 2012). 
 75 Richard M. Phillips, ITSFEA & Controlling Person Liability for Insider Trading 
Violations, AM. LAW INST. at *222-23 (May 3, 1990) (citing a senior official at the SEC as 
publicly explaining that “the existence of effective procedures would weaken the 
Commission’s ability to show reckless conduct” but noting that “the absence of procedures 
would not result in the converse presumption”); 134 CONG. REC. S17,218 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 
1988) (Statement of Sen. Proxmire) (suggesting that failure to take appropriate preventative 
action while possessing knowledge that a controlled person had committed a violation in the 
past could constitute a basis for liability). 
 76 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
 77 Donald C. Langevoort, 18 INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & 
PREVENTION § 8:5 (2011). 
 78 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Haddad, S.E.C. Release No. 13473, 1992 WL 383778 (Dec. 
17, 1992); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Adelt, S.E.C. Release No. 18442, 2003 WL 22492696 
(Nov. 3, 2003); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Barclays Bank PLC, S.E.C. Release No. 20132, 
2007 WL 1559227 (May 30, 2007); see also The Ret. Sys. of Ala., Exchange Act Release No. 
57446, 2008 WL 762991 (Mar. 6, 2008) (investigating into possible insider trading at pension 
fund, noting potential controlling persons liability and that the suspect trading in question 
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settlement suggests that the SEC expects supervisors to make inquiries based on red 
flags emerging from the trades themselves, such as a pattern of initiating profitable 
trading shortly before announcements.79  In SEC v. Haddad, the SEC alleged that a 
financial representative at a broker-dealer made several highly successful trades on 
the basis of MNPI that he obtained from an investment banker regarding upcoming 
takeovers.  The complaint asserted controlling persons liability on the basis that the 
broker-dealer and the representative’s managers “learned of” the five highly 
successful trades “at or about the time that such trading activity occurred” which 
was, as mentioned above, “just prior to the announcements that those companies 
were the subject of takeover attempts.”80  Nevertheless, the supervisors “failed to 
make any serious inquiry” of the representative’s reason for making the 
transaction.81 
The other two cases allege fairly obvious violations.  In one, the controlling bank 
failed to “wall off” a proprietary trader from entering trades based on information he 
received from serving on creditors committees on behalf of the bank.82  In the other, 
an employee traded the company’s stock as part of the company’s own stock option 
program during a period when he was in possession of MNPI, which was a regular 
occurrence as part of his duties; the SEC claimed that, despite this violation, the 
company failed to take steps to prevent the employee from further trading in the 
stock during periods when he was in possession of MNPI.83 
C.  Application to “Innocent Bystander” Managers 
If the SEC pursues a charge under ITSFEA, it would likely proceed on the basis 
of the same evidence as discussed above in Part II.E.  However, managers would 
have a better chance of dismissing such charges than a charge under 20(a), because 
the SEC bears the initial burden of demonstrating lack of good faith under the first 
prong, and a defendant would be able to point to its robust compliance systems to 
parry any attempt under the second prong of the statute. 
IV.  SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY 
A.  Section 203(e) and (i) of the Investment Advisers Act 
Bystander managers may also face control person liability under section 203 of 
the Investment Advisers Act (IAA), which provides the SEC with authorization to 
censure, place limitations on the activities of, or suspend/revoke the registration of 
an entire investment advisory firm84 or an individual advisor,85 as well as seek civil 
                                                           
“could have been prevented if RSA had adequate policies and procedures to assure 
compliance with the federal securities laws”). 
 79 See generally Haddad, 1992 WL 383778. 
 80 Id. at *11.  
 81 Id. at *11-12. 
 82 See generally Barclays Bank, 2007 WL 1559227. 
 83 Adelt, 2003 WL 22492696, at *2. 
 84 15 U.S.C.A, § 80b-3(e)(6) (West 2012). 
 85 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(f) (West 2012). 
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money penalties,86 for failing to supervise personnel who violate the Exchange Act 
or other securities laws.  Liability can be imposed even when the underlying violator 
was a rogue employee who conspired to break the law.87 
Generally, the standards imposed by the IAA are “comparable to those in the 
Securities Exchange Act.”88  The IAA defines a liable party in general terms as one 
who “has failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing violations of the 
provisions of such statutes, rules, and regulations, another person who commits such 
a violation, if such other person is subject to his supervision.”89  It also provides for a 
defense that  
no person shall be deemed to have failed reasonably to supervise any 
person if there have been established procedures, and a system for 
applying such procedures, which would reasonably be expected to prevent 
and detect, insofar as practicable, any such violation by such other person, 
and such person has reasonably discharged the duties and obligations 
incumbent upon him by reason of such procedures and system without 
reasonable cause to believe that such procedures and systems were not 
being compiled with.90 
This provision is different from both 20(a) and the ITSFEA.  On one hand, it is 
similar to 20(a) in that the defendant has the burden of proving an affirmative 
defense of good faith.91  However, it is more similar to ITSFEA than 20(a) in 
specifying the creation of robust compliance systems to detect wrongdoing as a 
prerequisite to asserting the defense,92 and in the potential for a monetary penalty. 
Finally, the language that the control person is “without reasonable cause to believe” 
that violations have occurred may indicate a somewhat lower bar for recklessness 
than that of 20(a) or the ITSFEA, a conclusion that would accord with the 
administrative nature of this charge. 
Several cases have imposed liability on investment advisory firms as well as 
senior personnel of such firms for failing to supervise portfolio managers based on 
section 203, but no cases specifically concern insider trading.93  The decisions 
                                                           
 86 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(i)(1)(A)(iv) (West 2012). 
 87 In re William V. Giordano, Exchange Act Release No. 36742, 1996 WL 21031, at *4 
(Jan. 19, 1996) (liability imposed for failure to supervise rogue “direct access” trader who 
conspired with his wife to charge excessive mark-ups). 
 88 HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 24, at 11:6. 
 89 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e)(6) (West 2012). 
 90 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e)(6)(A)-(B) (West 2012). 
 91 See In re Scudder Kemper Inv., Inc., Investment Advisor Act Release No. 1848, 1999 
WL 1240645, at *4 (Dec. 22, 1999). 
 92 See HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note. 24, at 11:10 (“Unlike supervision, these concepts 
[including section 20(a)] do not impose operational requirements on the broker-dealer.”). 
 93 See In re CS First Boston Inv. Mgmt. Corp., Investment Advisor Act Release No. 7583, 
1998 WL 652134 (Sept. 23, 1998); In re Rhumbline Adv., Investment Advisor Act Release 
No. 1765, 1998 WL 667626 (Sept. 29, 1998); In re Dawson-Samberg Capital Mgmt., Inc., 
Investment Advisor Act Release No. 1889, 2000 WL 1062685 (Aug. 3, 2000); In re 
Vanderbilt Capital Adv. LLC, Investment Advisor Act Release No. 2053, 2002 WL 2005452 
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primarily discuss two sources of liability.  First, they frequently cite a supervisor’s 
failure to follow up, or a delay in doing so, after becoming aware of “red flags” 
indicating possible fraud;94 as stated in one case: “Supervisors must respond 
vigorously to indications of possible wrongdoing . . . Red flags and suggestions of 
irregularities demand inquiry as well as adequate follow-up and review.  When 
indications of impropriety reach the attention of those in authority, they must act 
decisively to detect and prevent violations.”95 
Second, several of these cases turn on the strength or lack thereof of the 
compliance programs for which the control person is ultimately responsible.  The 
SEC has also instituted proceedings against advisers for failing to engage in 
independent reviews of portfolio manager transactions in order to catch violations.96  
The SEC has specifically frowned upon relying on personnel to self-report their 
activities and relying on their trustworthiness.97  In addition, the Commission looks 
to whether the firm instituted formal compliance procedures, preferably in writing.98  
Finally, the Commission has noted that advisers “must also provide effective 
staffing, sufficient resources, and a system of follow-up” in order ensure that the 
firm is able to enforce their procedures.99 The SEC has repeatedly ruled that 
                                                           
(Sept. 3, 2002); In re Scudder Kemper, 1999 WL 1240645; In re First Capital Strategists, 
Investment Advisor Act Release No. 1648, 1997 WL 458704 (Aug. 13, 1997). 
 94 See In re CS First Boston, 1998 WL 652134, at *4 (involving supervisor that failed to 
investigate further for over a month after noticing red flag); In re Rhumbline, 1998 WL 
667626, at *3 (involving supervisors that failed to follow up on discrepancies in option 
spreads and positions in excess of amount permitted by guidelines); In re First Capital, 1997 
WL 458704, at *7 (involving supervisors that ignored excessive trading and other 
discrepancies). 
 95 In re Rhumbline, 1998 WL 667626, at *4. 
 96 See In re Scudder Kemper, 1999 WL 1240645, at *5 (imposing liability for failing to 
review order tickets and reports and reconcile the tickets with reports in order to catch trading 
in excess of authorized amount); In re First Capital, 1997 WL 458704, at *7 (involving firm 
that failed to independently run mark-to-market analysis or review to ensure trader’s positions 
were properly hedged); In re Vanderbilt Capital, 2002 WL 2005452, at *3 (providing no 
procedures for review of transaction prices, traders have “unsupervised control”); In re 
Dawson-Samberg, 2000 WL 1062685, at *7 (involving firm that failed to require a 
“designated compliance individual to conduct a periodic review” of “soft-dollar” vendors). 
 97 In re Dawson-Samberg, 2000 WL 1062685, at *7. 
 98 See id. at *6 (involving firm that failed to establish a “clear procedure” for complying 
with soft-dollar credit rules, did not provide “clear or sufficiently detailed instructions,” and 
noting that “written procedures also would have clarified” the duties of personnel); In re 
Rhumbline, 1998 WL 667626, at *4 (stating that firm “had no policies or procedures designed 
to detect or prevent unauthorized trading,” nor any “system for risk management or for 
monitoring the CIO’s trading”); In re First Boston, 1998 WL 652134, at *4 (stating that firm 
“lacked adequate procedures to ensure that marketing materials . . . did not mislead . . . . [and] 
also lacked adequate procedures to ensure that the Portfolio Manager complied with the 
Firm’s investment policies”). 
 99 In re Dawson-Samberg, 2000 WL 1062685, at *6 (stating that firm “devoted inadequate 
resources to soft dollar compliance and control mechanisms . . . .  The Registrant relied on 
Mack’s on-the-job training . . . without substantive review or follow-up . . . the lack of formal 
training and guidelines became a problem. . . .”). 
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improper procedures are enough to impose supervisory liability even if there was a 
total absence of red flags.100 
On the other hand, a particular strong compliance program can be a way to avoid 
liability under the IAA.101  For example, in Piper Capital Management, in addition to 
numerous primary charges, the SEC looked to impose liability under section 203 for 
failing to supervise portfolio managers who violated a fund’s disclosed investment 
guidelines and objectives.102  The judge rejected this claim, noting that the defendant 
“established a multi-layered and integrated internal supervisory system,” including 
an Operations Department (which “was tasked with ensuring compliance between 
portfolio holdings and prospectus investment restrictions and was provided with 
written guidelines”), a Risk and Control Committee (which was created to monitor 
risk, volatility and adherence to objectives, and which included representatives from 
management and peer portfolio managers), an Audit Committee, and the Board of 
Directors.  The judge found that the supervisor established a system that “reasonably 
could have been expected to prevent and detect securities laws violations.”103 
In responding to any control person charges under section 203 of the IAA, firms 
and managers will need to defend against the lack of follow-up on any suspicions 
that a rogue trader may have been relying on illicit information.  In addition, the 
compliance systems and procedures at a firm will be scrutinized by the SEC, in 
particular any policies and procedures relating to the illegal conduct in question.  In 
any case, as mentioned above there is no precedent for using this provision in the 
context of insider trading, or in federal court.  Even though there does not appear to 
be any formal bar for doing so, the SEC may decide to not assert it for this reason. 
B.  Cease and Desist Enforcement 
Another option for supervisory liability for insider trading is for the SEC to 
simply sanction a firm through ordering it to cease and desist from failing to 
establish and follow proper policies and procedures and requiring it to institute such 
procedures in the future.  Such charges have a long history of precedent with regards 
to insider trading specifically, as well as a lack of a recklessness requirement, 
although it will not have the opportunity to either assert a civil action in federal court 
(as would be possible with a 20(a) or 21A charge) or collect civil money penalties 
(as would be possible under section 203(e) and (i) of the IAA). 
                                                           
 100 See In re Gary W. Chambers, Exchange Act Release No. 27963, 1990 WL 311728 
(Apr. 30, 1990); In re Blinder, Robinson & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 19057, 1982 WL 
33,469 (Sept. 17, 1982); see also In re William V. Giordano, Exchange Act Release No. 
36742, 1996 WL 21031, at n.4 (Jan. 19, 1996) (“While the presence of ‘red flags’ warning of 
possible irregularities may often be an aggravating factor, the absence of such warning signs is 
not a defense where the gravamen of the supervisory deficiency is a failure to have reasonable 
procedures.”). 
 101 See In re Piper Capital Mgmt. Inc., S.E.C. Release No. 175, 2000 WL 1759455, at *59-
60 (Nov. 30, 2000). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at *60. 
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1.  Section 203(k) of the Investment Advisers Act 
First, under section 203(k) of the Investment Advisers Act, if the SEC determines 
that any person or firm “is violating, has violated, or is about to violate” any 
provision of the Investment Advisers Act, it may enter an order requiring the person 
or firm to cease and desist from committing such a violation.104  More applicable to a 
hedge fund, the SEC can apply the same order to anyone who “would be a cause” of 
such a violation, in effect creating control person liability.105  In addition, the order 
can require the primary violator or the supervisor to take steps to ensure compliance 
in the future, either on a permanent or temporary basis,106 and order disgorgement, 
although not monetary penalties.107  The statute broadly permits a finding of a 
“cause” based on any “act or omission the person knew or should have known would 
contribute to such violation.”108   
As a primary violation, the SEC can point to section 204A of the Advisers Act, 
which affirmatively requires registered investment advisers to “establish, maintain, 
and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed, taking into 
consideration the nature of such investment adviser's business, to prevent the misuse 
. . . of material, nonpublic information by such investment adviser or any person 
associated with such investment adviser.”109  As many hedge funds are now required 
to register with the SEC, this provision may apply to them.  The legislative history 
has provided clues as to what type of policies and procedures would be adequate 
under section 204A.  First, the procedures must be in written form, and disseminated 
widely within the firm.110  Second, the legislative history demands a proactive 
approach by supervisors both with respect to ensuring that the policies are followed 
by personnel and updating the necessary controls when called for.111  The House 
Report also specifies that firms should educate their personnel regarding firm 
policies and the federal securities laws generally.112 
2.  Exchange Act 
A parallel provision in the Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to institute a cease-
and-desist order to protect against a violation of any provision of the Exchange 
Act.113  An employer’s failure to develop or implement proper policies and 
procedures to prevent insider trading could be sufficient to “cause” a violation and 
permit a cease-and-desist order, as the statute broadly permits a finding of a “cause” 
based on any “act or omission the person knew or should have known would 
                                                           
 104 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(k)(1) (West 2012). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(k)(5) (West 2012). 
 108 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(k)(1) (West 2012). 
 109 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-4a (West 2012). 
 110 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 21 (1988). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 22. 
 113 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-3(a) (West 2012). 
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contribute to such violation.”114  In such a situation, the Commission would be able 
to point to a primary violation, or potential violation, of section 10(b) or 21A; 
indeed, theoretically they could also claim that a firm’s lack of proper procedures 
may “cause” supervisors to be liable as controlling persons.115  The SEC might 
consider using this provision instead of asserting traditional controlling persons 
liability under section 20(a) or 21A in a situation where the requirements of 
recklessness under those provisions is not met. 
3.  Case Law 
As opposed to the fairly rare enforcement of controlling persons liability for 
insider trading under section 20(a) or 21A, the SEC has instituted numerous 
administrative cease-and-desist orders against financial institutions for failing to 
enact proper policies and procedures to protect against insider trading by 
personnel.116  At least seven proceedings relied in part on the Investment Advisers 
Act provision requiring policies and procedures.117  In addition, the SEC, for 
apparently the first time, recently asserted a claim under section 204A of the 
Advisers Act in federal court, obtaining a default judgment against an investment 
adviser based in part on its failure to follow proper policies and procedures.118  
However, the SEC has yet to enter a cease-and-desist order alone under the 
Exchange Act for causing or potentially causing a violation of 10(b) or 21A. 
The case most concerning to an “innocent bystander” manager would appear to 
be In re Massachusetts Financial Services Company.119  There, the SEC instituted 
cease-and-desist proceedings against an investment adviser under section 204A.  The 
firm allegedly “paid several outside consultants to gather information . . . from 
various sources . . . concerning the financial markets, as well as political, budgetary 
and regulatory developments in Washington.”120  The SEC alleged that one such 
consultant disclosed an upcoming Treasury Department announcement concerning a 
                                                           
 114 Id. 
 115 The Exchange Act also contains an affirmative provision to establish, maintain and 
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent insider trading by 
employees, but that provision only applies to broker-dealers.  See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-1 (West 
2012). 
 116 See In re Merrill Lynch, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 2851, 2009 WL 613541 (Mar. 
11, 2009); In re Guy P. Wyser-Pratte, Exchange Act Release No. 1934, 2001 WL 487946 
(May 9, 2001); In re Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 2526, 2006 WL 
1749842 (June 27, 2006); In re Banc of Am. Sec. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 55466, 
2007 WL 763699 (Mar. 14, 2007); In re Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., Investment Advisors Act 
Release No. 2165, 2003 WL 22056989 (Sept. 4, 2003); In re Gintel Asset Mgmt., Inc., 
Exchange Act Release No. 2079, 2002 WL 31499839 (Nov. 8, 2002); In re Money Growth 
Inst., Inc., Investment Advisors Act Release No. 1506, 1995 WL 442094 (July 14, 1995); In 
re Belsen Getty, LLC, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 3212, 2011 WL 2139876 (May 
31, 2011). 
 117 See releases cited supra note 116. 
 118 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Locke Capital Mgmt., 726 F. Supp. 2d 105, 106 (D.R.I. 
2010). 
 119 In re Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., 2003 WL 22056989. 
 120 Id. at *1-2. 
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particular type of bond to a firm employee, who subsequently traded that bond; the 
announcement resulted in the bond experiencing its largest one-day price change in 
more than ten years.  While the firm did have a written policy regarding MNPI, it did 
not specify the potential for receiving MNPI from outside consultants, only noting 
company insiders and advisers such as attorneys. The SEC argued that the firm’s 
procedures “did not describe the potential that consultants . . . could obtain and 
provide” MNPI to the firm, nor were there any written guidelines discussing the use 
of such consultants.121  The SEC ordered the firm to cease-and-desist under 204A, 
and in addition censured the firm and required it to pay a civil money penalty under 
203(e), discussed in Part IV.122  While obviously application of this decision to a 
bystander manager would require additional development regarding a firm’s policies 
relating to illicit conduct by the rogue trader, this decision is notable for the detail it 
demanded of the defendant firm’s policies. 
V.  PRIMARY LIABILITY 
A.  Conscious Avoidance 
Perhaps the greatest concern for any manager is being directly liable for insider 
trading due to the activities of a rogue trader.  The “conscious avoidance” doctrine 
would make such a nightmare possible.  However, the doctrine only applies when 
the evidence shows that the defendant subjectively must have realized that the 
information was in all likelihood illicit, and not just some type of recklessness or 
negligence commonly asserted for control person liability, as discussed above.  As a 
result, there is little chance of it being applied to “innocent bystander” managers. 
As defined by the Supreme Court, this doctrine can result in a defendant being 
considered as aware of a fact without knowing it as such, if (1) the defendant 
subjectively believe[s] that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the 
defendant take[s] deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”123  Case law has 
used the “conscious avoidance” doctrine, in both the criminal and civil context, as 
one avenue to prove the scienter element of a 10b5 insider trading charge.  The 
defendant’s conscious avoidance creates liability under the “misappropriation 
theory,” which "requires that the defendant subjectively believe that the information 
received was obtained in breach of a fiduciary duty” by providing the 
“circumstantial evidence” sufficient to indicate such belief.124  As this is just 
evidence supporting the claim that the defendant had such a belief, if the defendant 
indeed had a subjective belief that the information was not illegally obtained, despite 
the high probability otherwise, that removes the conscious avoidance issue.125  As 
applied, this doctrine would impute to a fund manager the knowledge that the rogue 
trader had received information in breach of a duty of trust or loyalty, and 
subsequently passed that information to the fund manager, despite the fact that the 
trader had never told the manager that his activities were illegal.   
                                                           
 121 Id. at *2. 
 122 Id. at *3-4. 
 123 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011).   
 124 United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1996).   
 125 See United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that the 
instruction failing to include this point was clear error). 
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However, this doctrine probably does not fit the circumstances of a “rogue 
trader” situation.  A charge based on “conscious avoidance” is only appropriate 
when the defendant displayed a very high level of recklessness and “deliberately 
avoided learning the truth,” not when the evidence only tended to show that “the 
defendant had not tried hard enough to learn the truth” or that “there was only 
equivocal evidence that the defendant had actual knowledge.”126  The facts 
underlying decisions that apply the “conscious avoidance” doctrine solidify the 
conclusion that it is only applicable where the defendant was either certain or should 
have been certain that the information was illicit.  For example, in one case, despite 
the length of a chain of tippers and tippees of information ultimately emanating from 
an employee at Sullivan & Cromwell, the evidence showed that the “sophisticated 
investor” defendants were “quite certain” that the information they received was 
from confidential sources.127  In two others, the defendant received information 
directly from bank employees and communicated with the tippers shortly before 
several major corporate announcements,128 circumstances which one of the decisions 
classified as “overwhelmingly suspicious.”129  In another, the tipper was an 
investment banker and the doctrine precluded the claim that he did not know that the 
client documents he provided to the tippee, a very close friend, were material.130 
B.  Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability 
Another potential source for primary liability is aiding and abetting liability.  
Although plaintiffs in private securities litigation are precluded under the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Central Bank from bringing aiding and abetting claims for 
securities fraud violations, the SEC has authority under section 20(e) of the 
Exchange Act, passed into law by Congress shortly after that decision, to bring 
claims for aiding and abetting any violation of the Exchange Act.131  One source has 
suggested that “if the SEC deemed an employer’s conduct in relation to an 
employee’s insider trading to be sufficiently active and egregious, it could name the 
employer as an aider and abettor of the employee’s illegal trading in a federal court 
injunctive action.”132  Indeed, the SEC recently brought an aiding and abetting action 
in the insider trading context specifically.133   
                                                           
 126 United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 127 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Musella, 678 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).   
 128 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Sekhri, No. 98 Civ. 2320(RPP), 2002 WL 31100823, at *13 
(S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2002); United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 477-78 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 129 Svoboda, 347 F.3d at 480. 
 130 United States v. Rahim, 339 F. App’x. 19, 25 (2d Cir. 2009).   
 131 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(e) (West 2012). 
 132 Gordon & Schaffer, supra note 32; see also Jennifer Banzaca, 4(38) HEDGE FUND L. 
REP. (Oct. 27, 2011) (quoting a former senior SEC enforcement attorney that “the SEC can 
sue a hedge fund manager for aiding and abetting insider trading”). 
 133 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Aragon Capital Advisors LLC, No. 07-cv-919, 2011 WL 
3278907, at *17-18 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss aiding and abetting 
claim). 
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Aiding and abetting is just one of the many potential charges for secondary 
actors, but it is a particularly serious one due to the potential for defendants to 
receive the same punishment as those directly responsible for the insider trading.  
Section 20(e) provides that “any person that knowingly provides substantial 
assistance to another person” towards any violation of the Exchange Act is liable for 
that violation “to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is 
provided.” 134  Lesser forms of secondary liability for managers and other financial 
professionals include failing to supervise traders and act on “red flags,”135 as well as 
failing to maintain proper control policies and procedures.136  In addition, an entity 
can be found liable for the civil and criminal violations of its employees.137 
Unsurprisingly, however, an aider and abettor must have violated stricter 
requirements than which exists under many other secondary claims.  Courts have 
broken down this language into several distinct requirements.  As explained by a 
recent Southern District decision, a 20(e) claim “must allege (1) a primary violation 
of the Exchange Act, (2) . . . knowledge of the violation by the aider and abettor, and 
(3) that the aider and abettor substantially assisted the primary violation.”138  The 
first requirement would include insider trading or one of the Exchange Act’s other 
provisions.  In terms of the second “knowledge” requirement, Congress specified in 
the “Dodd-Frank” legislation passed in 2010 that recklessness in addition to actual 
knowledge would be sufficient to plead an aiding and abetting charge.139 
C.  Prior Law on “Substantial Assistance” Requirement 
The third requirement that the defendant provided “substantial assistance” to the 
primary violator is the one where the law has only recently changed.  Previously, 
many lower courts in the Second Circuit have delimitated a strict standard to meeting 
this hurdle, the same as that used by courts deciding aiding and abetting claims in 
private litigation before the Supreme Court precluded private claims.140  Under this 
standard, courts have provided that in enforcement actions the complaint must allege 
that the aider and abettor's conduct was a “substantial causal factor” in the 
perpetuation of the underlying violation,141 and that the acts of the aider and abettor 
“proximately caused” the primary violation.142  As the courts explained, this meant 
                                                           
 134 Id. 
 135 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1(b)(1)(A) (West 2012); 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(f) (West 
2012); 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(i)(1)(A)(iv) (West 2012).  
 136 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1(b)(1)(B) (West 2012); 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-4a (West 
2010); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(f) (West 2010).  
 137 See generally In re Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., S.E.C. Release No. 296, 2005 WL 
2237628 (Sept. 15, 2005). 
 138 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Dibella, 587 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 139 Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (imposing liability on “any person that 
knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of [the 
securities laws]”). 
 140 Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 141 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Zwick, No. 03 Civ. 2742(JGK), 2007 WL 831812, at *16 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2007). 
 142 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Treadway, 430 F. Supp. 2d 293, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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that  a “defendant provides substantial assistance only if [[s]he] affirmatively assists, 
helps conceal, or by virtue of failing to act when required to do so enables the fraud 
to proceed.”143  Conversely, a defendant's inaction was sufficient only if the 
defendant’s inaction was “designed intentionally” to aid the primary fraud or it was 
in conscious or reckless violation of a duty to act.”144  Thus, “[a]wareness and 
approval, standing alone, do not constitute substantial assistance.”145  On the other 
hand, a very strong showing of “scienter” or intent can counteract a relatively weak 
showing of substantial assistance to permit a case to go forward.146 
One recent decision illustrated how to apply these doctrines to the insider 
trading context.  In SEC v. Aragon Capital Advisors, LLC,147 the court denied the 
motions to dismiss the SEC’s aiding and abetting charges against two of the 
individual defendants.  The SEC claimed that these two individuals aided and 
abetted because their brokerage accounts were used for the trading involved.  The 
court, in refusing to dismiss these charges, noted that the charges involved “more 
than mere awareness” because the allegations also stated that the secondary 
defendants would receive the profits from the trades in these accounts, and because 
the sheer length of the scheme “supported the inference that their inaction was 
intentional.”148  The court also reasoned than the high level of scienter shown on the 
defendants’ part also militated in favor of allowing the charges to go forward.149 
D.  New Standard of Second Circuit 
However, the Second Circuit recently relaxed the standards for pleading 
“substantial assistance.”  In the case before the court, the defendant negotiated the 
details of the transaction at issue, signed agreements designed to hide a company’s 
risks, and approved or had knowledge of fraudulent invoices issued by the company 
for whom he worked, even though others were responsible for bringing about the 
fraudulent sale-leaseback transaction at issue and the defendant never authorized 
them to do so.  In an opinion written by District Court Judge Jed Rakoff, sitting by 
designation on the circuit panel, the court rejected the strict standard above as 
applicable only to private litigation, which seek monetary damages as compensation 
                                                           
 143 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Winnick, 406 F. Supp. 2d 247, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 144 Treadway, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 339 (quoting Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d 
Cir.1983)). 
 145 Armstrong, 699 F.2d at 92 (2d Cir.1983). 
 146 ITT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir.1980) (“there may be a nexus between the 
degree of scienter and the requirement that the alleged aider and abettor render ‘substantial 
assistance’”), abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 
2869 (2010); ABF Capital Mgmt. v. Askin Capital Mgmt., L.P., 957 F. Supp. 1308, 1328 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“where there are particularly strong allegations of motivation and scienter, 
the allegations of substantial assistance need not be as directly tied to the [primary fraud 
violation]”). 
 147 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Aragon Capital Advisors, LLC, No. 07-cv-919, 2011 WL 
3278907 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2011). 
 148 Id. at *18. 
 149 Id. at n.17. 
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for damages incurred by particular plaintiff.150  In contrast, the court argued, a looser 
standard must be provided to enforcement actions such as those brought by the SEC 
towards the goal of deterring wrongdoing.  As the court explained, “[m]any if not 
most aiders and abettors would escape all liability if such a proximate cause 
requirement were imposed since, almost by definition, the activities of an aider and 
abettor are rarely the direct cause of the injury brought about by the fraud.”151  As a 
result, the court applied a standard used in criminal cases that defined an aider and 
abettor as anyone who made some purposeful contribution to a fraud’s success, even 
if the participation was not a cause in the literal sense.152  In the court’s words, 
quoting from a 1938 decision, the aider and abettor must “in some sort associate[] 
himself with the venture . . . participate[] in it as in something that he wishe[s] to 
bring about” and “[seek] by his action to make it succeed.”153   
As applied to an “innocent bystander” manager, regardless of whether his or her 
mental state met the recklessness required under 20(e), the involvement with a rogue 
trader would likely not satisfy the substantial assistance requirement.  The three most 
likely points of support for the idea that the manager “assisted” the rogue trader are 
that the firm provided financial backing and compensation to the trader.  However, 
these points do not appear to support a finding of “substantial assistance.”  First, 
with regards to the capital, this would not be unique to the illegal investment at 
issue.  In addition, as one decision indicates, merely providing the account in which 
the trading takes place is at best considered inaction;154 indeed, in that decision, the 
defendants suspiciously provided their own personal account to the trader, 
apparently in an attempt to avoid connection between the trading and a person with 
access to confidential information.  Finally, compensation appears to be a non-starter 
as such compensation again is not unique to the trader at issue and in any case post-
hoc compensation cannot show that the manager “proximately caused” the fraud 
itself.   
VI.  CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
This Part proceeds by discussing the requirement for any criminal liability for 
securities fraud and then discusses any requirements unique to specific charges.  
Generally, the strict mental state that the Exchange Act requires for criminal liability 
makes any criminal prosecution based on control person liability unlikely for an 
“innocent bystander” manager.  Generally, it is true that “Congress may 
constitutionally impose criminal liability upon a business entity for acts or omissions 
of its agents within the scope of their employment.”155  However, the Exchange Act 
only provides for criminal liability against someone who violates its provisions 
                                                           
 150 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 151 Id. at 213. 
 152 Id.  
 153 Id. at 212. 
 154 See Aragon, 2011 WL 3278907, at *17-18 (ruling that person who knew of illegal 
activity but did not prevent trader from using his account was considered inaction). 
 155 United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972) (citing United 
States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125-26 (1958)). 
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“willfully.”156  The Second Circuit defines that term as “a realization on the 
defendant’s part that he was doing a wrongful act” [under the Exchange Act] in a 
situation where “the knowingly wrongful act involved a significant risk of effecting 
the violation that has occurred.”157  This definition includes two particular parts of 
note.  First, the defendant must realize that he or she is doing something wrong; in 
the words of the case that set the Second Circuit’s standard in this regard, the statute 
must be violated “intentionally and deliberately” and not as the result of an “innocent 
mistake, negligence, or inadvertence.”158  Second, while specific intent is not 
required, the act must involve a “significant risk” of violating the law. 
A.  Conspiracy 
While theoretically, the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) could also assert liability 
against a manager as a co-conspirator with traders who committed insider trading, 
such a charge against an “innocent bystander” manager would appear to be baseless.  
To prove a conspiracy to commit an “offense against the United States” such as 
securities fraud, “the government must prove: (i) an agreement between the 
defendant and others as to the object of the conspiracy; (ii) specific intent to achieve 
the objective of the conspiracy; and (iii) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy 
by the defendant or one of his co-conspirators.”159  Even disregarding that the mental 
state of a bystander manager would not match that required for a criminal charge, 
such a manager certainly would not have made an “agreement” with a rogue trader 
to commit insider trading.  As a result, such a charge would have no basis. 
B.  Criminal Aiding and Abetting Liability 
In addition to the primary violator, anyone who “aids, abets, counsels, 
commands, induces or procures the commission of an offense against the United 
States is punishable as a principal for the underlying offense.”160  However, a 
defendant is only liable for aiding and abetting if he or she knew about the violation 
and provided “substantial assistance” to the primary violator.161  In all likelihood the 
USAO would not be able to bring such a charge against a bystander manager, both, 
as discussed above, due to the likely lack of “substantial assistance” provided by the 
manager to the rogue trader, and also due to the manager’s lack of actual knowledge 
of any potential fraud on the part of the rogue trader. 
                                                           
 156 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a) (West 2012). 
 157 United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 158 United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 159 United States v. Montour, 944 F.2d 1019, 1024 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. 
Sprecher, 783 F. Supp. 133, 156-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 988 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(citing Montour, 944 F.2d at 1024 in case partially based on conspiracy to commit securities 
fraud). 
 160 Sprecher, 783 F. Supp. at 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 161 See generally Graham v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 222 F.3d 994, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(reviewing the elements of aiding and abetting liability); In re Michael T. Sullivan, Investment 
Advisors Act Release No. 1849, 1999 WL 1240647, at *3 (Dec. 22, 1999) (reviewing 
elements of charge in context of assertion of aiding and abetting liability against investment 
adviser). 
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C.  Criminal Violation of Section 20(a) 
A criminal charge under section 20(a), while a theoretical possibility, is 
extremely unlikely and has not been previously brought.  As an initial matter, section 
20(a) is a strict liability-like statute that simply requires control and a primary 
violation, and mentions no specific mental state or even any specific act.  Seemingly 
this would be at odds with the black-letter principle in criminal law that there is no 
criminal liability for strict liability offenses.  While, as discussed infra in Part 
II.A.2., the courts have added a requirement of “culpable participation” to section 
20(a) claims, a requirement to which virtually all courts in the Second Circuit 
subscribe, the courts describe this element as requiring recklessness or “willful 
blindness”— concepts that imply something distinct from actual knowledge of 
committing a violation. 
Second, the government’s standing to enforce 20(a) is uncertain.  The statute 
previously extended standing for this cause of action “to any person to whom such 
controlled person is liable.”162  As the Exchange Act includes government agencies 
in the definition of “person,”163 the Second Circuit has held that the SEC has 
standing to enforce this section.164  However, because some courts have rejected the 
SEC’s standing,165 the SEC historically brought relatively few actions under this 
provision.  Recently, a provision of the Dodd-Frank Act amended 20(a) to explicitly 
provide standing to the SEC as well.166  However, this provision only singled out the 
SEC and did not generally grant standing to the United States. No secondary sources 
discuss the possibility of a criminal charge for violations of 20(a).  In sum, there is 
likely no criminal liability for a violation of section 20(a). 
CONCLUSION 
Obviously every case will depend on the specific facts present.  However, 
generally it appears unlikely that the government would be able to sustain any 
primary liability, either through aiding and abetting or the conscious avoidance 
doctrine, or any criminal liability against an “innocent bystander” manager due to the 
activities of a rogue trader.  On the other hand, sustaining a traditional charge of 
control person liability, based on such sources as section 20(a) or 21A of the 
                                                           
 162 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(a) (West 2012). 
 163 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(9) (West 2012).  This provision also includes the 
“government” itself in the definition, so seemingly the Second Circuit’s reasoning would 
provide the United States with standing as well. 
 164 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996); see 
also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975); 
accord Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. J.W. Barclay & Co., Inc., 442 F.3d 834 (3d Cir. 2006); Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n v. Scrushy, No. CV-03-J-615S, 2005 WL 3279894 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 
2005); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Buntrock, No. 02 C 2180, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9495, at 
*27-28 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Fitzgerald, 135 F. Supp. 2d 992 (N.D. Cal. 
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Exchange Act or section 203 of the Investment Advisers Act, will depend on 
whether the facts provide an indication of reckless conduct, and the legal bar for the 
government would be lowered if they work through an administrative procedure 
alleging a lack of proper policies and procedures regarding insider trading, based on 
the SEC’s cease-and-desist power. 
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